

## CHAPTER I

# Antiquities Before Christianities

### 1.1 – *Eleutheria*

The battle rages under the walls of Troy, when Hector is sent back to the city by his brother, the augur Helenus, to ask the women and elders to pray. Once in Troy, Hector also angrily rouses his brother Paris to the fight. Paris seeks reconciliation, which Hector defers to after the ousting of the Greeks, when a κρητήρα (...) ἐλεύθερον<sup>19</sup> [*krētēra (...) eleutheron*], literally a free krater, that is, a mixing-bowl in honour of freedom, will be offered to the gods.

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<sup>19</sup> *Iliad.*, 6.528.

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Homer deploys the word *eleutheron* not only in association with the word *krētēr*, bowl, but also with the word *hēmar*, day. In turn, the phrase *eleutheron hēmar*, literally, free day, in the Homeric narration is almost immediately reversed as δούλιον ἡμαρ<sup>20</sup> [*doulion hēmar*], slavish day. In all these cases, our modern reading requires a somewhat metaphorical shift from the literal translation of Homer's lines: more precisely, we have to project onto the Homeric text our habit of constructing reality with abstract nouns, such as 'freedom' and 'slavery.'

Of course, I am not refusing to translate the Homeric expressions *eleutheron krētēr* and *eleutheron hēmar* with English periphrases such as 'the bowl to celebrate freedom' and 'the time of liberty' respectively. I am rather suggesting that we resist the temptation to absolutize our current language uses as the inevitable outcome of past language transformations.

Neither was the word *eleutheron* necessarily to evolve as the abstract term *eleutheria*, nor, *pace* Jakobson,<sup>21</sup> was a pre-existing metaphorical pole to allow our hermeneutic transformation of a historically determined expression (*eleutheron*, free) into another expression (*eleutheria*, freedom) yet to appear. For sure, still at the time of Plato the shift from epithets such as good, pious, and beautiful to their nominalised forms (the good, the pious, and the beautiful, as we previously recalled) deeply puzzles Socrates' interlocutors.

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.463.

<sup>21</sup> Jakobson describes the supposed significant and distinctive functions of language as metaphorical and metonymical poles respectively. See Roman Jakobson, 'Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances,' in Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, *Fundamentals of Language* (The Hague: Mouton, 1956), 53–82.

Moreover, whilst we nowadays rely on a well-established grammatical taxonomy that allows us to classify *eleutheron* as an adjective and *eleutheria* as a (derived) noun, this categorisation is yet to appear in ancient Greece. It is Plato who possibly invents<sup>22</sup> the first repartition of language parts as a simple dichotomy<sup>23</sup>: ὀνόματα [*onomata*] and ῥήματα [*rhēmata*].<sup>24</sup>

Plato makes the unspecified Ξένος [*Xenos*], Stranger, or better, Foreign Guest<sup>25</sup> – the main character of his dialogue *The Sophist* – turn these two terms already in use into technical linguistic definitions: ‘we may call a *rhēma* the indication which relates to action (...) and the vocal sign applied to those who perform the actions in question we call an *onoma*.’<sup>26</sup>

The word *rhēma* is not part of the Homeric lexicon. Its first extant occurrence is in a seventh-century BCE poetic fragment by Archilochus, where it may be understood as a solemn announcement.<sup>27</sup> Only one century later, Theognis deploys it as a synonym

<sup>22</sup> Plato possibly invents the term γραμματική [*grammatikē*], that is, grammar: however, Plato may merely be writing words that are already in use. See Plato, *Cratylus* 431e; *Sophist* 253a.

<sup>23</sup> On *diáiresis*, that is division into two parts as *methodos*, pursuit and thus method, see Plato, *Soph.* 235b–c.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 262a. In the first century, Plutarch, who is already used to our familiar plurality of grammatical entities, seeks to answer the question ‘why said Plato, that speech is composed of *onomata* and *rhēmata*?’ In Plutarch, *Moralia*, Platonic Question X. *Onomata* and *rhēmata* are the plural form of *onoma* and *rhēma* respectively.

<sup>25</sup> On the word *xenos*, see Émile Benveniste, *Le Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*, 2 vols (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1969), vol. 1, 94. Eng. trans. *id.*, *Indo-European Language and Society* (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), 77.

<sup>26</sup> τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ὄν δῆλωμα ῥήμα που λέγομεν (. . .) τὸ δὲ γ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἐκείνας πράττουσι σημεῖον τῆς φωνῆς ἐπιτεθὲν ὄνομα [*to men epi tais praxessin on delōma rhēma pou legomen (. . .) to de g’ ep’ autois tois ekeinas Prattousi sēmeion tēs phōnēs epitethen onoma*]. In Plato, *Soph.* 262a.

<sup>27</sup> Archilochus, fr. 52 (Diehl).

for ‘word.’<sup>28</sup> However, the Platonic Guest associates *rhēma* with the expression of an action, so that it may appear as the first definition of a key grammar notion: the verb.<sup>29</sup>

The translation of the second term of the dichotomy proposed by the Guest, namely *onoma*, may likewise appear deceitfully unambiguous. Whilst the term has already the meaning of ‘name’ in Homer,<sup>30</sup> the definition of the Platonic Guest seems to refer to the logical subject of the sentence, and we may be tempted to translate this other half of Plato’s dichotomy with a later grammatical definition of a specific part of discourse: the noun, indeed.

Plato also deploys the couple *onoma* and *rhēma* in his (possibly previous) dialogue *Cratylus*, with the apparent meaning of ‘word’ and ‘phrase’ respectively.<sup>31</sup> Aristotle recovers the partition with its later sense, that one suggested by the Platonic Guest; yet, his use of the term *rhēmata* is closer to the logical notion of predicates than to the grammatical definition of verbs. However, in his language classification in the *Poetics*, Aristotle does not name adjectives, which instead appear in the *Rhetoric* under the broad definition of ἐπιθετα<sup>32</sup> [*epitheta*], that is, additions<sup>33</sup> or epithets.

If we consider existing works, it is not until the second century BCE that Dionysius Thrax grants adjectives a status (albeit not

<sup>28</sup> Theognis, 1152; 1238b (Diehl).

<sup>29</sup> Whilst Plato does not further specify the association of *rhēma* with actions, Aristotle limits it to actions in the present, and he recurs to the compound definition πρῶσις ῥήματος [*ptōsis rhēmatos*], tense of the verb, for actions in other times. In Aristotle, *De Interpretatione* 16b.

<sup>30</sup> *Il.* 3.235; 17.260.

<sup>31</sup> Plato, *Cra.* 399b.

<sup>32</sup> Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.2.9.

<sup>33</sup> Aristotle uses the expression τὰ ἐπιθετα [*ta epitheta*] in its etymological meaning of ‘added things’ in *Constitution of the Athenians* 3.3.

autonomous) in the grammatical arena. Dionysius is traditionally acknowledged as the author of the Τέχνη γραμματική [*Tekhnē grammatikē*], the art of grammar, which is the first extant Greek grammar. Whilst the *Tekhnē* recasts the traditional Platonic partition of *rhēmata* and *onomata*, the latter are further subdivided into three categories, the last of which is devoted to the ἐπίθετον [*epitheton*], that is, the addition, or epithet: Dionysius gathers under this Aristotelian label both adjectives and nouns that are used with the function of modifiers.

Only much later do adjectives emerge as independent grammatical entities. In the twelfth century, Abelard recalls *adjectiua*<sup>34</sup> as specific grammar items, which grammatically concord with the associated nouns: within flexional languages such as Greek and Latin, concord distinguishes adjectives from appositions. It is somewhat ironic that Abelard gives adjectives theoretical visibility by acknowledging them as *nomina adjectiua*, that is, literally, adjoining names.<sup>35</sup>

I am soon to show how, during the first documented wave of nominalisation in Western languages, the word *eleutheria*, freedom, which now we define as a noun, is derived from the word *eleutheros*, free, which now we define as an adjective. Yet, if a clear-cut severance between adjectives and nouns is only claimed nineteen centuries after the beginning of the Greek nominalising

<sup>34</sup> '[E]t illi adiectiua tantum dicunt ea quae aliis, id est substantiuis, per se adiunguntur,' and they [the grammarians] call adjectives those items that are adjoined to other nouns, the substantives, in Abelard, *Glossae super Peri Hermeneias* 5.78.

<sup>35</sup> The distinction is clearly stated, among others, by Aquinas: '*haec est differentia inter nomina substantiva et adiectiva, quia nomina substantiva ferunt suum suppositum, adiectiva vero non, sed rem significatam ponunt circa substantivum,*' this is the difference between substantives and adjectives: substantives bear their *suppositum*, while adjectives do not, but rather they adjoin the signified thing to the substantive. In Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 1.39.5 ad 5.

process, we may at least consider the possibility to construct this crucial transformation less anachronistically.

Rather than rendering the derivation of *eleutheria* from *eleutheros* with the language of later grammar, we may describe it in Aristotelian terms as the transformation of a predicate into a subject. This description likewise applies to Plato's transformations of epithets into ideas, and we may well understand the birth of *eleutheria* as part of the genesis of philosophical abstractions.

Moreover, the task of rendering this transformation goes also beyond the shift, however important, from adjectives to nouns, or predicates to subjects: what is also at stake is the role of our current categories in the construction of the past. Inasmuch as we acknowledge our retrospective projections and their inevitability, the diachronic – that is, historical – differentiation of the past from the present (which is the achievement of historicism) may not be enough: we may also have to acknowledge a synchronic differentiation between the various depictions of the past in the present.<sup>36</sup>

However, if we observe the use of the word *eleutheron*, free, in the *Iliad*, a diachronic, or historical differentiation emerges: *eleutheron* does not directly characterise a specific human subject as a free subject, as we would expect according to our current use of the term 'free.' In Homer, *eleutheron* rather defines a significant

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<sup>36</sup> Historicism's diachronic differentiation overcomes the crude rendering of the past as a present in different clothes, as it were: nevertheless, given the inevitability and the variety of our retrospective projections, we would better accept as a theoretical horizon the actual plurality of diachronic constructions, rather than iterating the historicist aspiration to a potentially objective history. Historians may have dreamed of history in the singular, but they always produced histories in the plural.

object (the krater) and a portion of time (the day) as free: human subjects are only implicitly described as free, through their relation with such objects and times, which act as a sort of objective correlative<sup>37</sup> to the subjective condition of freedom.

Besides, though the condition of freedom is experienced individually, it is either maintained or lost as a collective endowment: by depicting the day as either free or slavish, Homer alludes to a human group and its shared condition, which depends on the result of the war.<sup>38</sup>

Following its appearance in the epic,<sup>39</sup> the term *eleutheron* is then related to its dichotomous counterpart *doulion*, slavish: the loss of the war immediately entails for all the defeated the loss of their free condition. In the *Iliad*, this loss is prefigured by those female prisoners that the Greeks capture during the war.

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<sup>37</sup> Eliot claims that the expression of an emotion in the form of art requires an objective correlative, that is 'a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that *particular* emotion.' In T. S. Eliot, 'Hamlet and His Problems,' in *id.*, *The Sacred Wood* (London: Methuen & Co., 1920), 92. We may consider Homer's krater as an objective correlative to the condition of freedom, inasmuch as it evokes the latter's celebration.

<sup>38</sup> Benveniste insists on the social origin of the notion of 'free': 'The first sense is not, as one would be tempted to imagine, 'to be free of, rid of something'; it is that of belonging to an ethnic stock designated by a metaphor taken from vegetable growth.' In Benveniste, *Vocabulaire* 1, 324. Eng. trans. *id.*, *Indo-European*, 264.

<sup>39</sup> Before the Homeric epic, a probable predecessor of the Greek word *eleutheron* is found in Minoan tablets: for example, in several *Na-* tablets of the series of Pylos, the word *e-re-u-te-ra*, possibly the neuter plural form of *e-re-u-te-ro*, is likewise associated with the ideogram *sa* denoting an object (probably flax), and it is translated by Ventris and Chadwick as 'free allowance.' In Michael Ventris and John Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek: Three Hundred Selected Tablets from Knossos, Pylos and Mycenae, with Commentary and Vocabulary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), 299. The term *ereutero* may - but also may not - relate to humans with a metaphorical shift. See Filippo Cassola, 'Ελεύθερον - EREUTERO,' in *Syntheleia Arangio Ruiz* (Napoli: Jovene, 1964). However, the morphological similarity does not imply an unbroken semantic continuity.

The dispute over one of them, the princess Briseis, is in fact the cause of the major event in the narration, namely, the wrath of Achilles. Actually, though Briseis is part of the booty, she is treated by Achilles as a wife: Patroclus even insists that she will be formally married after the end of the war and the return to Phtia.<sup>40</sup>

However, only a few centuries after the composition of the Homeric poems, the grammatical association of the term *eleutheros* with human subjects does directly express their free condition: the first extant occurrences of this association are in the fragments of Solon.

Solon's surviving texts witness both old and new uses of the word *eleutheros*. In an impressive poetic piece, Solon constructs a parallel between humans and γῆ<sup>41</sup> [*gē*], the land. On the one hand, he claims to have stripped the land of the stones that mark the condition of debt<sup>42</sup>: hence the land, which was a slave before, is now *eleuthera*, free. In this powerful image, the land is both metaphorically free, as in Homer, and literally free from its marking objects. On the other hand, Solon recalls the many formerly enslaved Athenian men, whom he proudly affirms ἐλευθέρους ἔθηκα<sup>43</sup> [*eleutherous ethēka*], I made free.

<sup>40</sup> We may compare the position of Briseis with Agamemnon's treatment of Chryseis, which then triggers Apollo's wrath.

<sup>41</sup> (. . .) Γῆ μέλαινα, τῆς ἐγὼ ποτε / ὄρους ἀνεῖλον πολλαχῆ πεπηγότας / πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρα [*Gē melaina, tēs egō pote / horous aneilon pollakhē pepēgotas / prosthen de douleuousa, nyn eleuthera*], the black Earth, from which once I removed many implanted boundary-posts, once a slave, now free. Quoted in Aristotle, *Const. Ath.* 12.4.

<sup>42</sup> Solon hints at his economic-political reform, the σεισάχθεια [*seisakthēia*] or shaking off of burdens, around 594 BCE. See Aristotle, *Const. Ath.* 6.1.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.4.

We may assign Solon's fragments to the first half of the sixth century BCE. We have instead to wait for the first half of the following century to meet the first example of nominalisation of the term *eleutheros*, which appears in the text of Pindar's eighth Isthmian ode. The poem is composed not after 478 BCE, and probably before the Battle of Plataea, where in 479 BCE a wide Greek coalition inflicts a decisive defeat on the Persian invaders.

Pindar makes an allusion to the danger hovering over Greece, and he suggests that even contemporary ills may be healed with ἐλευθερία<sup>44</sup> [*eleutheria*], which we may translate as 'freedom.' We may observe that the new nominalised term *eleutheria* is feminine, possibly following the tradition of the various Greek goddesses who personify arts and virtues. However, as the rest of the poem is devoted to mythological narrations, it is the further occurrence of the word *eleutheria* in Pindar's first Pythian ode that offers us more ground for interpretation.

The new word also appears in its Ionic<sup>45</sup> version ἐλευθερίῃ<sup>46</sup> [*eleutheriē*] as part of a commemorative inscription of the Greek victory over the Persians. These verses may be those which Pausanias ascribes to Simonides,<sup>47</sup> but neither the author nor the dating of the text are certain.

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<sup>44</sup> (...) ἰατὰ δ' ἔστι βροτοῖς σὺν γ' ἐλευθερία / καὶ τὰ [*iata d'esti brotois syn g'eleutheria / kai ta*], it happens to the mortals that these things too (are) healed with freedom. In Pindar, *Isthmian* 8 15–16. The word *eleutheria* is in the dative case. Patterson suggests that Pindar here consoles himself for the siding of his native Thebes with the Persian invader. In Orlando Patterson, *Freedom, Vol. 1: Freedom in the Making of Western Culture* (London: Tauris & Co., 1991), 85.

<sup>45</sup> Ionic, Aeolic, Dorian, and Attic are the main variants of Classical Greek language.

<sup>46</sup> *Anthologia Palatina* 7.253.

<sup>47</sup> Pausanias 9.2.5.

For sure, Pindar composes the first Pythian ode in 470 BCE to sing the praises of the Syracusan tyrant Hieron, whose chariot has just won the race at the Pythian Games in Delphi. The celebration of the victory allows Pindar to hail also another major feat of Hieron, who has recently founded for his son Deinomenes the city of Aitna, θεοδμάτω σὺν ἐλευθερίᾳ<sup>48</sup> [*theodmatō syn eleutheria*], (endowed) with a god-crafted condition of freedom.

In the previous sentence, Pindar produces a semantic shift from the Homeric text, where the epithet *theodmētos*,<sup>49</sup> god-built, is used to commend the remarkable city walls of Troy. Pindar applies the Doric version<sup>50</sup> of the epithet – *theodmatos* – to a feature of the city of Aitna that is not material, but abstract: its condition of self-determination.

As we saw, before Pindar the Greeks describe this condition with another epithet, namely, *eleutheros*. We also saw that Pindar derived from this epithet the feminine term *eleutheria*: he can thus deploy the new word as an abstract substitute (the city's freedom) for the Homeric concrete object (the city walls).

Pindar's neologism seems to conflate the free determination of the tyrant Hieron – who is not only the subject, but also the client of

<sup>48</sup> τῷ πόλιν κείναν θεοδμάτω σὺν ἐλευθερίᾳ / Ὑλλίδος στάθμας Ἰέρων ἐν νόμοις ἔκτισσ'. (. . .) [*tō polin keinan theodmatō syn eleutheria / Hyllidos stathmas Hierōn en nomois ektiss*], for whom [Deinomenes] Hieron founded that city with divinely fashioned freedom, in accordance with the laws of the rule of Hyllus. *Pythian 1*, 61–62. Hyllus is the son of Herakles and mythical ancestors of the Dorians, to which both Sparta and Pindar's aristocratic Boeotian family belong.

<sup>49</sup> θεοδμήτων ἐπὶ πύργων [*theodmētōn epi pyrgōn*], on the god-built city walls, in *Il.* 8.519.

<sup>50</sup> Pindar's dialect is actually a literary product that combines the language of epic with Doric and Aeolic elements. In several cases, the Doric *ā* [*ā*] substitutes the Epic and Attic *η* [*ē*].

the poem – with the self-determination of the city of Aitna.<sup>51</sup> This notion of free determination at its highest degree is also expressed by another neologism,<sup>52</sup> ἔλευθερίος<sup>53</sup> [*eleutherios*], which Pindar applies to Zeus as father of the goddess Τύχα [*Tykha*], Fortune. Whilst the word *eleutherios* is generally translated as ‘deliverer’ or as ‘liberal’,<sup>54</sup> in this context it seems rather to emphasise Zeus’ freedom as unlimited possibility to act, which generates a likewise unlimited (good) chance.<sup>55</sup>

However, it may not be by chance that the word *eleutheria* emerges right at the height of the Persian Wars: the new term both epitomises and catalyses the joint war effort of the Greeks, as it relies on the Homeric dichotomy of *eleutheron* and *doulion* to acknowledge the shared Greek condition of freedom from the impending Persian domination.

A further shift occurs during the Peloponnesian Wars as a mere semantic transformation of the word *eleutheria*, which is appealed to by the Athenians as a specific quality of their political

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<sup>51</sup> Pindar may even play on the ambiguity of *eleutheria*’s reference to both freedom from an external power (the Carthaginians just defeated by Hieron), and freedom granted by the oligarchic constitution from the unrestrained power of the tyrant (in this case, a veiled exhortation to Hieron).

<sup>52</sup> Herodotus’ mention (3.142) of the erection of an altar to Zeus Eleutherios in Samos shortly after 522 BCE is highly questionable.

<sup>53</sup> λίσσομαι, παῖ Ζητὸς Ἐλευθερίου, / Ἰμέραν εὐρυσθενέ’ ἀμφιπόλει, σώτειρα Τύχα [*lissomai, pai Zēnos Eleutheriou, / Himeran eurysthene’ amphipolei, sōteira Tykha*], I pray you, saviour Fortune, daughter of Zeus Eleutherios, that you watch and maintain powerful Himeras. In *Olympian* 12 1–2. The ode focuses on the unexpected turn of chance that led its addressee Ergoteles from Crete to Sicily, and to the victory at the Olympian games.

<sup>54</sup> See, for example, the inscription on the altar to Zeus Eleutherios at Plataea, which is likewise doubtfully ascribed to Simonides, in *Anthologia Palatina* 6.50.

<sup>55</sup> Unlike his contemporary rival Simonides, Pindar subjects even chance to the new order of Zeus.

constitution. This new meaning is first attested in the work of Herodotus, which appears around the year 425 BCE, a few decades after the composition of Pindar's eighth Isthmian ode.

Herodotus frequently uses the new word, which he writes in the Ionic version ἔλευθερίη<sup>56</sup> [*eleutheriē*]. He generally does not apply the new term to individual subjects but to political entities; yet more important, in Herodotus *eleutheriē* explicitly denotes a condition of emancipation not only from an external political power,<sup>57</sup> but also from the rule of an internal tyranny.<sup>58</sup>

Moreover, Herodotus also follows the grammatical path of the nominalisation of the neuter form *eleutheron*: he makes Xerxes express his distrust for the military ability of the Greeks because they are ἀνειμένοι (...) ἐς τὸ ελεύθερον<sup>59</sup> [*aneimenoι (...) es to eleutheron*], devoted to freedom. A similar nominalisation is attested in Euripides, who deploys it in the form τοῦλεύθερον<sup>60</sup> [*touleutheron*], which is a contraction with the definite article τὸ [*to*].

However, when in Herodotus *eleutheros* is somewhat associated with individual subjects, it is also an expression of social status: the Median king Astyages can recognize his young grandson Cyrus because of the latter's comparatively ἐλευθερωτέρη<sup>61</sup>

<sup>56</sup> Hdt. 1.62; 1.95; 1.170; 2.102; 3.82; 3.142; 4.133; 5.2; 6.5; 7.2; 7.135; 7.147; 8.143; 9.41; 9.98.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.95; 1.170; 2.102; 3.82; 4.133; 5.2; 7.2; 7.147; 8.143; 9.41; 9.98.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.62; 3.142; 6.5; 7.135. In 7.135, the Spartan characters link their fight for self-determination against the Persians with their condition as free citizens.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.103.

<sup>60</sup> Euripides, *Suppliants* 438.

<sup>61</sup> Hdt. 1.116. The superlative form ἐλευθερωτάτη [*eleutherōtatē*], the freest, is to become a trope of Athenian rhetoric, as an antonomastic evocation of Athens. See Nicia's speech in Thucydides 7.69.

[*eleutherōterē*], freer speech. Aeschylus shows the same logic at work by making the mythological character Κράτος<sup>62</sup> [*Kratos*], who embodies superior power, affirm that no one is free but Zeus.<sup>63</sup>

Sophocles pushes this logic to a tipping point when he acknowledges the presence of a virtual freedom even despite adverse conditions: Εἰ σῶμα δοῦλον, ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς ἐλεύθερος<sup>64</sup> [*Ei sōma doulon, all' ho nous eleutheros*], if the body (is) enslaved, the thinking agent at least (is) free. As Sophocles splits the free spirit from the practical condition of freedom, he opens the way to the ethical appropriation of this notion by the philosophers.

Actually, in both Plato and Aristotle, the political and ethical aspects of the notion of *eleutheria* are still inseparable. In particular, Plato mocks the excess of *eleutheria* in the democratic πόλις<sup>65</sup> [*polis*], the city, which assigns ἰσότητά τινα ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις<sup>66</sup> [*isotēta tina homoiōs isois te kai anisois*], a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike. According to Plato, only the rulers of his ideal city are to be δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως<sup>67</sup> [*dēmiourgous eleutherias tēs poleōs*], craftsmen of the city's freedom.

<sup>62</sup> In the Homeric text, the word *kratos* has both a comparative (superiority) and absolute (power) meaning. See Benveniste, *Vocabulaire* 2, 71–83. Eng. trans. *id.*, *Indo-European*, 357–367.

<sup>63</sup> ἐλεύθερος γὰρ οὔτις ἐστὶ πλὴν Διός [*eleutheros gar outis esti plēn Dios*]. In Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*, 50. *Kratos* operates according to Zeus' power, which is the norm and the expression of Zeus' new divine order.

<sup>64</sup> Sophocles, fr. 940, in Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 4.19.33 (Wachsmuth-Hense).

<sup>65</sup> ἐλευθερίας ἢ πόλις μεστὴ καὶ παρρησίας γίγνεται [*eleutherias hē polis mestē kai parrhēσίας gignetai*], the city becomes full of liberty and freedom of speech. In Plato, *Republic* 8.557b.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.558c. The alliteration underlines Plato's dismissal of freedom, which is rhetorically crafted as the ironical ascertainment of freedom's somewhat faulty logic.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 395c. Already in *Timaeus* 28a Plato turns the word *dēmiourgos*, artisan, into the definition of his world maker: in *Republic* 3.395c the use of the word is further

Moreover, Plato contends that whenever ‘a *polis* with a democratic constitution [is] thirsty with freedom,’<sup>68</sup> the order of things is likely to be subverted: as ‘freedom spreads to everything,’<sup>69</sup> it undermines the priority of fathers over sons, of citizens over alien residents and foreigners, of masters over slaves, and of men over women respectively.<sup>70</sup>

In the *Republic*, Plato notoriously puts forth as a remedy to the dreaded drift of democracy towards anarchy and tyranny a doubly threefold scheme, in which the ordered parts of the individual ψυχή [*psykhē*], the soul,<sup>71</sup> mirror those of the *polis*. The λογιστικόν<sup>72</sup> [*logistikon*] or calculative, that is, rational soul in the head is to control the other two centres: the Homeric chest-soul θύμος<sup>73</sup> [*thymos*], which Plato renames as θυμοειδής<sup>74</sup> [*thymoides*], spirited, and the ἐπιθυμητικόν<sup>75</sup> [*epithymetikon*], the appetitive soul that is set in the abdomen. These three inner entities correspond to the three classes of Plato’s ideal city: the ἄρχοντες<sup>76</sup> [*arkhontes*] or rulers, the στρατιῶται<sup>77</sup> [*stratiōtai*] or soldiers, and

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shifted towards an immaterial production, in which the guardians can be involved because they are released from all other productions. We may also notice Plato’s wordplay that endows the class of the rulers with a function that bears the name of the lowest class, namely that of the producers (*dēmiourgoi*).

<sup>68</sup> δημοκρατούμενη πόλις ἐλευθερίας διψήσασα [*dēmokratoumenē polis eleutherias dipsēsasa*], *ibid.*, 8.562c.

<sup>69</sup> ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἰέναι [*epi pan to tēs eleutherias ienai*], *ibid.*, 8.562e.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.562e–563b.

<sup>71</sup> Though the Platonic *psykhē*, through its Latin translation as *anima*, is traditionally rendered with the English word ‘soul,’ it rather gathers various and differently located bodily functions.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 439d.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 439e.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 440e.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 439d.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 339c.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 398b.

the δημιουργοί<sup>78</sup> [*dēmiourgoi*] or producers. However, later on, in the *Laws*, Plato also suggests a more pragmatic distribution of public roles according to a rule of proportional inequality,<sup>79</sup> which takes account of a variety of parameters, from virtue to wealth.

Aristotle describes *eleutheria* as the distinctive character of democracies according to the latter's supporters<sup>80</sup>: only from this perspective – he argues – do the self-determination of the city and that of the citizens converge as democratic order. In other words, for Aristotle the notions of *eleutheria* and δημοκρατία<sup>81</sup> [*dēmokratia*], democracy, may be part of a political composition, but they do not necessarily belong together. Only in the democratic constitution is the government of the city entrusted to the *eleutheroi*, that is, all the free citizens.<sup>82</sup> This is not surprising if, as I attempted to show, the notion of *eleutheria* is part and parcel of both the emergence of a generic power to act and its attribution to specific human subjects.

In the first book of the *Politics*, Aristotle constructs on this power to act a threefold structure of domestic command of masters over slaves, husbands over wives, and fathers over children.<sup>83</sup> The three despotic, matrimonial and paternal forms of command differ in kind from the political command over free men, because the

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 340e.

<sup>79</sup> τῷ ἀνίσῳ συμμετρῷ [*tō anisō symmetrō*], in Plato, *Laws* 5.744c.

<sup>80</sup> ἔν δὲ τὸ ζῆν ὡς βούλεται τις. τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἔργον εἶναι φασιν [*hen de to zen hōs bouletai tis: touto gar tēs eleutherias ergon einai phasin*], and one is for a man to live as he likes; for they say that this is the function of liberty. In Aristotle, *Politics*, 6.1317b 11–13.

<sup>81</sup> The word *dēmokratia* is first attested in Hdt. 6.43, where it is used to describe Otanes' proposal. For the association of *eleutheria* and *dēmokratia*, see Aristotle, *Pol.* 5.1310a.

<sup>82</sup> Aristotle specifies that there are several kinds of democratic constitutions, and the access to government of free citizens may also be partially restricted.

<sup>83</sup> Aristotle, *Pol.* 1253b.

former are determined by nature, and thus they are not reversible.<sup>84</sup> In particular, domestic powers are exerted on those people whose βουλευτικόν<sup>85</sup> [*bouleutikon*], that is, deliberative faculty, is impaired (slaves), devoid of authority<sup>86</sup> (women), and not yet fully developed (children) respectively. On the contrary, the political command over free men depends on the constitution of the city. We may notice that it is precisely the condition of being *eleutheros* that grants, on the one side, the domestic right of command over slaves, wife, and children, and on the other side, the political possibility either to rule or to be ruled in public.

Aristotle even questions the relation between master and slave, but he ends up turning this factual domination into the natural expression of human hierarchical differences. Here Aristotle applies a rhetorical reversal that is similar to the apparatus devised by Plato for constructing his forms. I recalled how Plato fabricates his ideal entities by turning current epithets into abstract qualities, such as, for example, the good and the beautiful. The actual referents of these abstract qualities, that is, good and beautiful things, then become mere imperfect instances of the qualities themselves, or, in Platonic jargon, copies of their ideal models. In the Aristotelian version of this reversal procedure, the Platonic forms are replaced by the natural order.

Aristotle also follows his master Plato in devising the same partition for the outer and the inner dimensions: Aristotle's *psykhē* mirrors

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<sup>84</sup> Also the constitutively unbalanced homosexual relation between free men is somewhat reversible, as the younger lover will exert a dominant role over a younger partner in due time.

<sup>85</sup> Aristotle, *Pol.* 1260a. Aristotle gives an extended definition of *bouleutikon* in *Eudemian Ethics* 1226b.

<sup>86</sup> The term used by Aristotle, ἄκυρος [*akyros*], is but an astonishing tautology: *a-kyros*, without authority.

his split domestic sphere, as ‘in it, indeed, there are by nature a ruling and a ruled part.’<sup>87</sup> Moreover, just as, for example, in Australian traditional culture kinship structures apply to the whole of reality,<sup>88</sup> for Aristotle the dichotomy between ruler and ruled casts its shadow not only on the human sphere, but on the whole *cosmos*:

Such a duality exists in living creatures, but not in them only; it originates in the constitution of the universe; even in things which have no life there is a ruling principle [*arkhē*], as in a musical mode.<sup>89</sup>

According to Aristotle’s crude universal projection of his authoritarian view, as the living being consists primarily of soul and body, ‘the one is by nature the ruler, and the other the subject.’<sup>90</sup> However, though Aristotle derives this absolute subordination from Plato,<sup>91</sup> he does not describe the couple of master and slave as a simple diaeretic<sup>92</sup> subdivision of reality, but as a more complex relation of uneven belonging:

The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him.<sup>93</sup>

<sup>87</sup> ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δ’ ἀρχόμενον [*en tautē gar esti physei to men arkhon to d’ arkhomenon*]. In *Pol.* 1260a. Aristotle develops a more complex threefold model of *psykhē* in his *De Anima*.

<sup>88</sup> See, for example, W. E. H. Stanner, ‘The Dreaming,’ in T. A. G. Hungerford ed., *Australian Signpost: An Anthology* (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1956), 51–65.

<sup>89</sup> τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἐμψύχοις; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἔστι τις ἀρχή, οἷον ἁρμονίας [*touto ek tēs hapasēs physeōs enyparkhei tois empsykhōis; kai gar en tois mē metekhousi zōēs esti tis arkhē, hoion harmonias*], in Aristotle, *Pol.* 1254a.

<sup>90</sup> τὸ δὲ ζῶον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὃν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δ’ ἀρχόμενον [*to de zōon prōton synestēken ek psychēs kai sōmatos, hōn to men arkhon esti physei to d’ arkhomenon*], *ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> For example, in *Alcibiades 1* 130a.

<sup>92</sup> See *supra*, note 23.

<sup>93</sup> διὸ ὁ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δούλου δεσπότης μόνον, ἐκείνου δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν: ὁ δὲ δούλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότητος δουλός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου [*dio ho men despotēs tou doulou despotēs monon, ekeinou d’ouk estin: ho de doulos ou monon despotou doulous estin, alla kai holōs ekeinou*]. In Aristotle, *Pol.* 1254a.

This is because for Aristotle a property stands in regard to its owner as a part in regard to the whole.<sup>94</sup> We may notice that a likewise asymmetrical and hierarchical relation of inclusion structures Aristotle's logical works and biological classifications.<sup>95</sup>

Moreover, according to Aristotle, the dichotomy between ἄρχειν [*arkhein*], to rule, and ἄρχεσθαι [*arkhesthai*], to be ruled, cannot be overcome, so that even the condition of *eleutheria* under a democratic constitution requires an alternation of roles: τὸ ἐν μέρει ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν<sup>96</sup> [*to en merei arkhesthai kai arkhein*], to be ruled and to rule in turn.

A more general opposition pits ποιεῖν [*poiein*], acting, against πάσχειν [*paskhein*], being acted upon.<sup>97</sup> As Aristotle gives absolute priority to acting, his general notion of δύναμις [*dynamis*], potency, is construed as the ability to be unaffected.<sup>98</sup> This aspect

<sup>94</sup> τὸ δὲ κτῆμα λέγεται ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ μόριον. τὸ γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄλλου: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κτῆμα [*to de ktēma legetai hōsper kai to morion. to gar morion ou monon allou esti morion, alla kai haplōs allou: homoiōs de kai to ktēma*], and the term 'article of property' is used in the same way as the term 'part': a thing that is a part is not only a part of another thing but absolutely belongs to another thing, and so also does an article of property, *ibid.*

<sup>95</sup> The tree-shaped iteration of the relation of inclusion is then to influence the principled structures of medieval legal texts, which in turn are to be the model for Western treatises in general.

<sup>96</sup> Aristotle, *Pol.* 1317b.

<sup>97</sup> The verb *paskhein* appears several times in the *Iliad* with the meaning of 'suffering': in *Odyssey* 8.490 it is paired with the verb ἔρδειν [*erdein*] in the phrase ἔρξαν τ' ἔπαθόν τε [*erxan t' epathon te*], (they) both did and suffered. Herodotus not only deploys the Homeric couple ἔρξαν ἢ ἔπαθον [*erxan ē epathon*], (they) did or suffered (5.65), but he also makes Xerxes evoke the alternative choice between ποιεῖν ἢ παθεῖν [*poiein ē pathein*], do or suffer (7.11): *pathein* is a form - the aorist infinitive - of the verb *paskhein*. Aristotle then often uses *paskhein* as a passive form of *poiein*: for example, in *De Generatione et Corruptione* 322b7; *Categories* 1b–2a; *Metaphysics* 1017a26; *De Anima* 429b; *Physics* 225b13.

<sup>98</sup> ἔτι ὅσαι ἐξεις καθ' ἃς ἀπαθῆ ὄλωσ ἢ ἀμετάβλητα ἢ μὴ ῥαδίως ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον εὐμετακίνητα, δυνάμεις λέγονται [*eti hosai hexeis kath'has apathē holōs ē ametablēta ē mē rhadiōs epi to kheiron eumetakinēta, dynameis legontai*], all states in virtue of

of Aristotelian potency may even be understood as a precursor to the notion of negative freedom.<sup>99</sup>

It is not difficult to see that the condition of being unaffected harks back to the archaic vocabulary of war.<sup>100</sup> In this case, it is somewhat ironic that the concern with the physical integrity of the individual warrior, after a long detour throughout the public sphere, both as the claim of political freedom and its recasting as a philosophical category, is then gradually turned back towards the individual sphere. Euripides' consideration that the soul of a slave may be more free than that of a free man<sup>101</sup> already appears to turn upside down Astyages' approach, as reported by his contemporary Herodotus. However, it is after the collapse of the city-states that Bion, himself a former slave, goes as far as literally erasing the state of fact, when he proclaims that 'good slaves are free, but bad men are slaves of many passions.'<sup>102</sup>

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which things are unaffected generally, or are unchangeable, or cannot readily deteriorate, are called potencies. In Aristotle, *Met.* 1019a. See instead Plato, *Soph.* 247d–e, where *dynamis* defines both the capacity to affect and the capacity to be affected. As previously recalled, the ability not to be affected is the essential criterion for the Aristotelian hierarchization of both the human and the non-human world.

<sup>99</sup> Immanuel Kant makes use of the notions of *negative*, negative and *positive*, positive freedom in his *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, in *id.*, *Gesammelte Schriften (Akademie Ausgabe, hereinafter AA)*, Band 4, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Reimer, 1911), 446. Eng. trans. *id.*, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Mary Gregor ed. and trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 52. Isaiah Berlin later popularizes these twin notions in the Anglophone world. See *id.*, *Two Concepts of Liberty* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958).

<sup>100</sup> Aristotle still describes the skills of soldiers as the ability to ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν [*poiēsai kai mē pathein*], do and not suffer (harm). In *Nicomachean Ethics* 1116b.

<sup>101</sup> πολλοῖσι δούλοις τοῦνομ' αἰσχρόν, ἢ δὲ φρήν τῶν οὐκὶ δούλων ἔστ' ἐλευθερώτερα [*polloisi doulois tou nom' aiskhron, hē de phrēn tōn oukhi doulōn est' eleutherōtera*], for many slaves their name is a thing of shame, but their soul is freer than that of a non-slave. In Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 4.19.39 (Wachsmuth-Hense).

<sup>102</sup> οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οἰκέται ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ πονηροὶ ἐλεύθεροὶ δούλοι πολλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν [*hoi agathoi oiketai eleutheroi, hoi ponēroi eleutheroi douloi pollōn epithymiōn*]. Bion of Borysthenes (c. 325 – c. 250 BCE), in Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 4.19.42 (Wachsmuth-Hense), my italics.

The polemical disconnection of freedom from actual practices, and its relocation to the inner recesses of the soul, at the same time witnesses a generalized retreat from the public sphere and produces a new individuation: the cosmopolitan<sup>103</sup> subjectivation of Hellenistic narrations. I will later show how in the hands of Jewish and then Christian authors, this new subjectivating path will end up producing a new social link, which appears as the result of individual choice.

## 1.2 – The Greek Constellation of Freedoms

As the path of freedom cannot be reduced to the transformations of a single word, I will now return to my starting point, so as to consider a veritable constellation of other terms. These terms do not simply integrate the core definition of freedom as expressed by the word *eleutheria*: on the contrary, insofar as morphological varieties, they are essential components of the semantic network that connects the various Greek notions of freedom. In particular, I will examine three groups of compound words, which are construed with the three prefixes ἄ- [a], ἰσο- [iso], and αὐτο- [auto] respectively.

At least since Homer,<sup>104</sup> the Greek language has deployed the letter α, alpha (αν [an] in front of vowels) as a prefix before words that define actions, agents, and qualities, in order to express their privation. For example, the derived English term ‘analgesic’ still characterizes drugs with the power of suppressing pain, ἄλγος [algos].

<sup>103</sup> Stoic writers borrow from Cynic Diogenes the term κοσμοπολίτης [kosmopolitēs], citizen of the world. In Diogenes Laërtius, 6.63.

<sup>104</sup> See, for example, the Homeric alliterative and paratactic sequence ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιός [aphrētōr athemistos anestios], clanless, lawless, hearthless, in *Il.* 9.63.

This language mechanism allows the expression of a specific free status as the absence of a determining factor. A most intriguing example is the isolated occurrence in the *Iliad* of the term ἄουτον<sup>105</sup> [*aouton*], unwounded. Is it not at least remarkable, the quasi-homophony of *aouton* with the word that defines the self (αὐτός, *autos*), especially considering that, in the Homeric poem of the massacres, bodily integrity appears as a most valuable asset, regardless of the ethics of ἀρετή [*aretē*], the virtue of the warrior?

However, the vocabulary of freedom takes further shape in the narrations of other armed confrontations. Whilst narrating the events of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides uses the word ἀνεπίτακτος<sup>106</sup> [*anepitaktos*] to define the power of acting without orders, and hence, an independent stance. The terms ἀβασίλευτος<sup>107</sup> [*abasileutos*] and ἀτυράννευτος<sup>108</sup> [*atyrannetos*] describe the condition of not being ruled by a king and by a tyrant respectively. Philo's later construction ἀνηγεμόνευτος<sup>109</sup> [*anēgemoneutos*] produces instead a metaphorical shift towards the inner dimension, as it laments the absence of a guide for the soul.

Back to the political sphere, the words ἄναρχος<sup>110</sup> [*anarkhos*], ἄναρκτος<sup>111</sup> [*anarktos*] and ἀναρχία<sup>112</sup> [*anarkhia*] depict, in an often derogatory way, a state of lack of authority and command. Moreover,

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<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.536.

<sup>106</sup> Thuc. 7.69.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.80.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.18.

<sup>109</sup> Philo, 'Concerning Noah's work as a planter' (*De Plantatione*) 53; 'On dreams, that they are God-sent' (*De Somniis*) 2.286.

<sup>110</sup> *Il.* 2.703.

<sup>111</sup> Aeschylus, *Suppliants* 514.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, 906.

both the words ἀνεύθυνος<sup>113</sup> [*aneuthynos*] and ἀνυπεύθυνος<sup>114</sup> [*anypeuthynos*] underline the alarming dearth of accountability of absolute rulers. The term ἄμοιρος<sup>115</sup> [*amoiros*] articulates the double nature of participation, as the latter's absence may be understood either as being excluded (from rights), or as being exempted (from duties).

An analogous duplicity is expressed by the participle ἀφειμένος<sup>116</sup> [*apheimenos*] and by the verbal adjective ἄφετος<sup>117</sup> [*aphetos*], which may also describe the position of having been freed from all incumbencies so as to be devoted to the gods.

The prefix alpha is also deployed to denote a limitation of freedom. Euripides uses with the sense of unrestrained frankness the word παρρησία<sup>118</sup> [*parrhēsia*] – from πᾶς [*pas*], all, and ῥῆσις [*rhēsis*], saying – which may also be understood as ‘freedom of speech’: hence, the term ἀπαρρησίαστος<sup>119</sup> [*aparrhēsiastos*] may be translated as ‘deprived of freedom of speech.’

The technical term ἀνεμπόδιστος [*anempodistos*], unhindered, may have been coined by Aristotle to render the absence of whatever obstacle to the pleasures ‘of progress towards the perfection of our nature.’<sup>120</sup> In the *Politics*, Aristotle recalls that ‘the happy

<sup>113</sup> Hdt. 3.80.

<sup>114</sup> Aristophanes, *Wasps* 587.

<sup>115</sup> Aeschylus, *Seven Against Thebes* 733.

<sup>116</sup> Euripides, *Electra* 379.

<sup>117</sup> Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* 666.

<sup>118</sup> Euripides first uses the word *parrhēsia* in the tragedy *Hippolytus* (line 424), together with the term *eleutheroi*, free (in the plural), as opposed to the metaphorical slavery to which one is subjected because of the wrongdoings of one's parents. For Plato's ironic use of the term *parrhēsia*, see *supra*, note 65.

<sup>119</sup> Theophrastus, fr. 103.

<sup>120</sup> τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως [*tōn eis tēn teleōsin agomenōn tēs physeōs*], in Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.* 1153a.

life is the life that is lived without impediment in accordance with virtue.<sup>121</sup>

For sure, the variety of words that construct the Greek notions of freedom with the privative alpha seems to confirm the *pars destruens*<sup>122</sup> of Benveniste's argument on the origin of ancient European notions of freedom: the semantic plurality evoked by these terms cannot be simply traced back to the sense of being free from someone or something,<sup>123</sup> as according to the notion of negative freedom.

In turn, the *pars costruens* of Benveniste's contention, that is, his suggestion of an ethnic bond as the original locus of the free condition,<sup>124</sup> clearly resonates with the Homeric use of the word *eleutheron*, and it is even better illustrated by the family of words compounded with the term *isos*, that is, equal.

Such compound words convey the various senses of sharing in a group: in turn, these senses construct freedom as a common entitlement. The Homeric lexicon includes several words that are construed with the prefix *iso-*: among them, the term *ἰσόμορος*<sup>125</sup> [*isomoros*] is claimed by the god Poseidon to describe his right to an equal share with his brothers Zeus and Hades. This divine equality is then turned into a human impossibility by Solon.

<sup>121</sup> τὸ τὸν εὐδαιμόνα βίον εἶναι τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον [*to ton eudaimona bion einai ton kat' aretēn anempodiston*], in Aristotle, *Pol.* 1295a.

<sup>122</sup> Bacon describes the destructive and constructive parts of his philosophy as *pars destruens* and *pars costruens* respectively. See Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum Scientiarum* (London: John Bill, 1620).

<sup>123</sup> Benveniste, *Vocabulaire* I, 324. Eng. trans. *id.*, *Indo-European*, 264.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.* Eng. trans. *ibid.*

<sup>125</sup> *Il.* 15.209.

In a revealing fragment, Solon qualifies his assertion of having given the land back to the Athenian people. This restitution does not involve in any way an equal distribution<sup>126</sup>: on the contrary, Solon associates in his disapproval the violence of the tyrant and the imposition upon the noble of *ισομοιρία* [*isomoiria*], that is, the equal sharing of the land with the base.<sup>127</sup>

In the sixth-century writings of Aëtius, Alcmaeon of Croton is reported to have used in the fifth century BCE the word *ισονομία*<sup>128</sup> [*isonomia*], in order to illustrate the bodily balance between couples of powers such as moist and dry, cold and hot, and bitter and sweet. According to Alcmaeon, this balance is the condition for health.

As the term *isonomia* in Alcmaeon's fragment may be a later addition by the scholiast, it is possible that Herodotus is the first to deploy this compound word, which he writes in its Ionic form *ισονομίη*<sup>129</sup> [*isonomiē*]. The word is construed with the term

<sup>126</sup> (...) οὐδὲ πείρας χθονός / πατρίδος κακοῖσιν ἐσθλοῦς ἰσομοιρίαν ἔχειν [*oude pieiras kthonos / patridos kakoisin esthlous isomoirian ekhein*], nor [it pleased me] that the nobles had an equal share of the fertile soil of the fatherland with the base. Fr. 23 Diehl, fr. 34 West, quoted in Aristotle, *Const. Ath.* 12.3.

<sup>127</sup> Aristotle expands this argument in *Politics* 1281a19–20: πάντων ληφθέντων, οἱ πλείους τὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων ἀν διανεμῶνται, φανερόν ὅτι φθείρουσι τὴν πόλιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἢ γ' ἀρετὴ φθείρει τὸ ἔχον αὐτήν, οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν: ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι δίκαιον [*pantōn lēphthentōn, hoi pleious ta tōn elattonōn an dianemōntai, phaneron hoti phtheirousi tēn polin. alla mēn oukh hē g' aretē phtheirei to ekhon autēn, oude to dikaion poleōs phthartikon: hōste dēlon hoti kai ton nomon touton oukh hoion t' einai dikaion*], when everybody is taken into account, suppose the majority share out among themselves the property of the minority, it is manifest that they are destroying the city; but assuredly virtue does not destroy its possessor, and justice is not destructive of the city, so that it is clear that this principle also cannot be just.

<sup>128</sup> Alcmaeon, fr. 24 B4 Diels-Kranz.

<sup>129</sup> Hdt. 3.80; 3.83; 3.142; 5.37. Despite the absence of evidence, Raaflaub suggests that the term may have originated much earlier, as 'an ideal and catchword in the aristocracy's struggle against the tyrant's usurpation of power.' In Kurt Raaflaub,

νόμος [*nomos*], which we may translate as ‘law,’ though it covers a wider semantic area than the English term.

*Pace* Schmitt,<sup>130</sup> only the word νομός<sup>131</sup> [*nomos*] is attested in Homer, with the meaning of ‘shared pasture,’ according to the traditional custom of sharing grazing land.<sup>132</sup> In its last occurrence in the *Iliad*, *nomos* undergoes a metaphorical shift, which seems to exploit its sharing in the semantic areas of growth and production: the phrase πολὺς νομός<sup>133</sup> [*polys nomos*] may thus be rendered as ‘manifold pasture (of words).’ An otherwise undocumented shift from pastoral commons to land subdivisions may be the remote antecedent to Solon’s rejection of the even repartition of *isomoiria*, whose principle of equality is instead recovered as a shared political standing.

*Isonomiē* may be somewhat rendered as ‘equality of rights,’ and Herodotus uses it to describe a political arrangement alternative to monarchy.<sup>134</sup> Herodotus probably coins also the term

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*The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece*, Renate Franciscano trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 94.

<sup>130</sup> Carl Schmitt locates at the very beginning of the *Odyssey* the word νόμος [*nomos*] (to which he also ascribes a supposed original sense of the spatial ordering of measurement) by relying on Zenodotus’ unlikely correction of the word νόος [*noos*] – inasmuch as different from the Attic form νοῦς [*nous*], that is, mind, or better, thinking and perceiving agent – as *nomos*, in *Od.* 1.3. In Carl Schmitt, *Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1950), 46; Eng. trans. *id.*, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, G.L. Ulmen trans. (New York: Telos Press, 2006), 76.

<sup>131</sup> *Il.* 2.475; 6.511; 15.268; 18.575; 18.587; 20.249. *Od.* 9.217; 10.159.

<sup>132</sup> ‘*Le pâturage des temps archaïques est en general un espace illimité*,’ in general, the pasture of archaic times is an unlimited space. In Emmanuel Laroche, *Histoire de la Racine NEM- en Grec Ancien* (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1949), 116.

<sup>133</sup> *Il.* 20.249.

<sup>134</sup> In Herodotus’ narration, the Persian nobleman Otanes clearly states the motivation for his proposal of *isonomiē*: οὔτε γὰρ ἀρχειν οὔτε ἀρχεσθαι ἐθέλω [*oute gar arkhein oute arkhesthai ethelō*], I neither want to rule nor to be ruled (3.83). As Berlin puts it, this is ‘the exact opposite of Aristotle’s notion of true civic liberty.’ In Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), xli.

ἰσηγορίη<sup>135</sup> [*isēgoriē*], which may be translated as equal right of speech – from ἀγορᾶσθαι [*agorasthai*], to speak in the assembly. He uses the term to depict the Athenian democracy.

The same Herodotus may have invented a third word, ἰσοκρατέες<sup>136</sup> [*isokratees*], which in his *Histories* describes the equal power of women and men of the people of the Issedones. In the following book of the *Histories*, Herodotus probably also coins the abstract term ἰσοκρατία<sup>137</sup> [*isokratia*], which his character, the Corinthian Socles, correlates with the deliberative assemblies that are threatened by the Spartans and their local allies.

Two other terms emerge in theatrical texts. Aeschylus, while providing a foundational narrative for the Athenian *polis* with his trilogy *Oresteia*, names the result of a deliberation as ἰσόψηφος<sup>138</sup> [*isopsēphos*], that is, totalling the same amount of votes on both sides. The intervention of the chairperson Athena, the motherless goddess eponym and protector of the city, affirms then the rights of the matricide Orestes and of the new deliberative order against the traditional blood links. When Euripides writes the *Phoenissae*, the new order is already accepted wisdom, so that Jocasta can invite her son Eteocles to honour the goddess Ἰσότης<sup>139</sup> [*Isotēs*], Equality, because τὸ ἴσον<sup>140</sup> [*to ison*], the equal, to wit, equality, is *naturally* lasting among humans.

<sup>135</sup> Hdt. 5.78. In Attic Greek, ἰσηγορία [*isēgoria*].

<sup>136</sup> Plural feminine nominative form of ἰσοκρατής [*isokratēs*], having equal power. *Ibid.*, 4.26.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.92.

<sup>138</sup> Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 741.

<sup>139</sup> Euripides, *Phoenissae* 536.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, 538.

Since Homer, many compound words are construed with the already recalled term *autos*, which we may translate as ‘self’ or ‘the same.’ In particular, Herodotus probably also produces a combination that is most significant in regard to our enquiry, namely, the word *αὐτόνομος*<sup>141</sup> [*autonomos*]. The term combines the prefix *auto-* with the word *nomos*, which, as we saw, in Herodotus’ time conveys the sense of acknowledged custom, and thus, law.

Herodotus uses the term *autonomos* twice, and in the plural form, in order to define people who break free from sovereign power in general in the first case,<sup>142</sup> and from an external power in the second.<sup>143</sup> This double sense is analogous to Herodotus’ double use of the word *eleutheriē*, which, as we saw, describes both the *polis*’ freedom from tyrannical rule and its independence from alien powers.

The relation of the *polis* with a major external power is at stake in Thucydides’ neologism *αὐτονομία*<sup>144</sup> [*autonomia*]. Though Hobbes translates the word *autonomia* into English as ‘liberty’ tout-court,<sup>145</sup> Thucydides appears to use it to define the position of the Greek *poleis* in relation to Athenian political control. More than that, the condition of *autonomia* assumes different senses depending on the context: it may be a unilateral claim liable of punishment from the perspective of Athens as hegemonic power,<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Hdt. 1.96; 8.140.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.96.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.140.

<sup>144</sup> Thuc. 3.46.5; 4.87.5; 8.21.1.

<sup>145</sup> See Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, Thomas Hobbes trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

<sup>146</sup> Thuc. 3.46.5.

a claim that the Spartans encourage other *poleis* to pursue,<sup>147</sup> or even a privilege obtained by Athenian concession, as happens to the city of Samos, after a successful concerted change of political regime.<sup>148</sup>

More generally, it is worth noticing that in Greek classical texts both words *autonomos* and *autonomia* are applied to collective entities and not to individuals. A notable exception underlines the unique condition of Antigone, whom the chorus of Sophocles' eponymous tragedy describes as descending to Hades still alive and *autonomos*,<sup>149</sup> that is, guided by her own moral rule.

Only in the writings of late Stoic authors do the words *autonomos* and *autonomia* come to be associated with individual freedom. In the first century, the freed slave Epictetus makes the term *autonomos* shift from a political to a natural attribute, as he applies it to animals too.<sup>150</sup> His contemporary Dio Chrysostom

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<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.87.5.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.21.1. Bickerman and Ostwald compare the notion of *eleutheria* with that of *autonomia*, which they both construct as more limited than the former, because of its relation to a stronger power. See Elias Bickerman, 'Autonomia. Sur un passage de Thucydide (I, 144, 2),' *Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité* 5 (1958), 313–344; Martin Ostwald, *Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History* (New York: Scholars Press, 1982).

<sup>149</sup> Sophocles, *Antigone* 821. I owe Davide Tarizzo (and possibly, Lacan) this quote, which made me suspect the presence of other exceptions. So far, I have found two early non-political occurrences of the terms *autonomos* and *autonomia*: Xenophon (*Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* 3.1) praises the Spartan Lycurgus for not letting Spartan boys be *autonomo*[i], that is, free from their tutors' oversight; on the contrary, Isocrates blames the very Spartan boys' *autonomi*[a] (*Panathenaic Oration* 12.215), which he associates with the encouragement that they receive to steal from non-Spartans, provided that they can go undetected (12.211–212).

<sup>150</sup> οὕτως ὀρέγεται τῆς φυσικῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ τοῦ αὐτόνομα καὶ ἀκώλυτα εἶναι [*houtōs oregetai tēs physikēs eleutherias kai tou autonoma kai akōlyta einai*], so much do they [the animals] desire their natural liberty, and to be autonomous and unhindered. In Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.1.27.

takes a further step by turning the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus' call for αὐτοπραγία<sup>151</sup> [*autopraxia*], that is, autonomous individual practice, into an appeal to the individual autonomy of the sage. According to Dio, even the wisest lawgiver cannot claim his [sic] *autonomia*,<sup>152</sup> because he has to adapt to political necessity: 'Indeed Solon himself, according to report, declared that he was proposing for the Athenians, not what satisfied himself, but rather what he assumed they would accept.'<sup>153</sup> The individual sage can instead be properly autonomous, because he can live according to his own law, inasmuch as he follows the ordinance of Zeus, that is, the law of nature.<sup>154</sup>

I note here that such a convergence of individual choice and universal order will be variously re-enacted in the following centuries. However, its definition in terms of individual autonomy will only reappear in the late eighteenth century, when Kant will make his moral theory revolve around the notion of *Autonomie des Willens*,<sup>155</sup> autonomy of the will.

In the meantime, Chrysippus seems also to introduce the term αὐτεξούσιος<sup>156</sup> [*autexousios*], with the meaning of having free

<sup>151</sup> See Plutarch, 'On Stoic Self-Contradictions' (*De Stoicorum repugnantiis*) 20.

<sup>152</sup> δηλον οὖν ὅτι τούτων μὲν οὐδενὶ μετὴν αὐτονομίας [*dēlon oun hoti toutōn men oudenī metēn autonomias*], evidently, no one of these [lawgivers] had a claim to autonomy. In Dio Chrysostom, *Orationes* 63.4.

<sup>153</sup> Σόλωνα μὲντοι καὶ αὐτὸν εἰρηκέναι φασὶν ὡς αὐτῷ μὴ ἀρέσκοντα εἰσηγεῖτο Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' οἷς αὐτοὺς ὑπελάμβανε χρῆσεσθαι [*Solōna mentoi kai auton eirēkenai phasin hōs hautō mē arekonta eisēgeito Athēnaiōis, all' hois autous hypelambane khresesthai*]. *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>154</sup> τῆς φύσεως νόμος [*tēs physeōs nomos*], *ibid.*, 5. Whilst Dio is generally associated with the Second Sophistic, in this text he shares with Stoic authors the notion of the necessary convergence of individual will towards natural law.

<sup>155</sup> Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, AA 4, 433.

<sup>156</sup> ποιῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης [*poiōn kai to autexousion meta tēs anagkēs*], acting out also the freedom of choice along with necessity, Chrysippus,

will: later on, Josephus gives the word a political sense too, and he probably derives from it the abstract term ἀυτεξούσια<sup>157</sup> [*autexousia*].

### 1.3 – The Roman Constellation of Freedoms

I will now go back in time again to follow a different path, which will trace first the Latin words *liber*, free, and *libertas*, liberty, and then, a constellation of Latin terms that describe specific freedoms. As compared with the previous enquiry on Greek terms, this path will be more openly conjectural, because Roman archaic and early Republican events are generally reported by rather late written sources.

As Benveniste underlines, the very term *liber* splits into a generic attribute and the name of the god Liber.<sup>158</sup> Adrien Bruhl argues that Liber is an autochthonous deity of growth of vegetation, who only in later times specializes in viticulture, and is then identified as Bacchus/Dionysus.<sup>159</sup> The semantic area of ‘growth’ likewise appears to connect vegetal and human stocks, so that the term comes to be used to describe a community of *liberi* as an ethnic

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*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* 2.975. The epithet ἐξούσιος [*exousios*] and the noun ἐξουσία [*exousia*] seem to be Thucydidean coinages (see, for example, 1.38), which cover the semantic range from undue license to right: the Platonic Socrates plays on this ambiguity when he sarcastically evokes the ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν [*exousia tou legein*], license to speak of Athenian citizens, in *Gorgias* 461e.

<sup>157</sup> Flavius Josephus, *De bello Judaico* 2.134. Josephus uses the term to underline two exceptions to the otherwise disciplined behaviour of the Essenes.

<sup>158</sup> Benveniste, *Vocabulaire* 1, 322. Eng. trans. *id.*, *Indo-European*, 263. Actually, a third use of the word *liber* relates to the inner bark or rind of a tree, especially in its use as a writing support: the term then comes to identify both a division of a written text, and a book *tout court*.

<sup>159</sup> See Adrien Bruhl, *Liber Pater. Origine et expansion du culte dionisiaque à Rome et dans le monde Romain* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1953).

group of free men, and also, by extension, of children as legitimate offspring.<sup>160</sup>

Already in the fifth century BCE, the difference between a Roman *liber*, that is, a free man, and a *servus*, that is, a slave, is clearly quantifiable: the eighth of the Twelve Tables, which pin down law in writing, decrees that an act of physical violence resulting in fractured bones requires a monetary compensation, which, at three hundred asses for a freeman, is double that for a slave.<sup>161</sup>

However, Liber and his female partner Libera also point to another social boundary, which divides the free population into patricians and plebeians. The Roman engineer and author Vitruvius takes as an architectural example the Roman temple of Ceres,<sup>162</sup> Liber, and Libera or, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus' later attribution, of Demeter, Dionysus and Kore.<sup>163</sup> The temple is erected in 493 BCE, probably on the slope of the Aventine hill,<sup>164</sup> as a fulfilment of a vow for a military victory,<sup>165</sup> and it somewhat assumes the role of a plebeian counterpart to the older sanctuaries that are devoted to the traditional Capitoline triad Jupiter, Mars and Quirinus.<sup>166</sup>

<sup>160</sup> In the Roman ancient marriage formula, the father of the bride addresses the future husband with the words '*liber(or)um quaesundum causa (or gratia)*,' to obtain legitimate children.

<sup>161</sup> 'MANU FUSTIVE SI OS FREGIT LIBERO, CCC, [SI] SERVO, CL POENAM SUBITO.' In Carl Georg Bruns, *Fontes Iuris Romani Antiqui* (Freiburg: Mohr, 1887), 28.

<sup>162</sup> Vitruvius, *De architectura* 3.3.

<sup>163</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Antiquitates Romanae* 6.94.

<sup>164</sup> Alfred Merlin, *L'Aventin dans l'Antiquité* (Paris: Fontemoing, 1906), 94.

<sup>165</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Antiquitates Romanae* 6.94.

<sup>166</sup> The Aventine Hill, which the 493 BCE *Lex Icilia de Auentino publicando* subdivides into small plots for the plebeians, may be considered as the counterpart to the patrician Palatine Hill.

Moreover, a goddess too shares her name with the abstract term *libertas*: during the Second Punic War, at the end of the third century BCE, another temple is consecrated to Libertas on the Aventine Hill,<sup>167</sup> which is an appropriate setting, considering its long history of association with the plebs. It is not surprising that the shrine soon takes a significant part in the confrontation between the tribunes of the plebs and the Senate, as it ends up hosting the census-tables.

At the same time, the poet Naevius links the celebrations of the god Liber to a temporary unrestrained condition that appears to unite all participants: '*Libera lingua loquemur ludis Liberalibus*,'<sup>168</sup> we shall speak with a free tongue at the festival of Liber.<sup>169</sup>

In the first century, when Livy narrates the events of the Roman Republic, the claim of *aequa libertas*,<sup>170</sup> that is, equitable freedom, seems to share with the definitions of *aequum ius*, equitable law, and *aequae leges*, equitable laws, the political meaning of the equal standing before the law of patricians and plebeians, regarded as groups and not as individuals.<sup>171</sup>

However, this later association of the term *libertas* with the fulfilment of plebeian demands<sup>172</sup> seems to express a further shift of

<sup>167</sup> Livy 24.16.

<sup>168</sup> Wallace Martin Lindsay ed., *Sexti Pompei Festi De verborum significatu quae supersunt cum Pauli epitome* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1913), 103.

<sup>169</sup> This eulogy of unrestrained behaviour is paradoxically expressed with a chain of alliterations.

<sup>170</sup> Livy 4.5.

<sup>171</sup> Apparently, the only two applications of the notion of *aequa libertas* to individuals are attested in Terence's recasting of Menander in *Adelphoe* 2.1.29, and in Quintilian, *Declamatio* 301.

<sup>172</sup> See, for example, Livy's depiction of the institute of *provocatio*, the appeal to the people's assembly to contest capital punishment, as *unicum praesidium libertatis*, the only stronghold of freedom, in 3.55.

sense, which transcends the traditional divide between patricians and plebeians. This is probably not so much a representation of the legal and then practical overcoming of the obstacles to the plebeian access to public offices, but the effect of the substantial loss of meaning of the term *libertas* under Imperial rule.<sup>173</sup>

I will now consider a number of other Latin words, which produce less wide-ranging definitions of freedom either through the evocation of emptiness as the absence of constraints, or with the addition of the negative prefix *in-*, which in the Latin language has a similar function to the Greek privative alpha.

The former cluster includes the word *licentia*,<sup>174</sup> whose semantic range goes from permission to dissolution; *vacivitas*,<sup>175</sup> emptiness; and *vacatio*,<sup>176</sup> freedom from service or duty; to the latter belongs the term *impunitas*,<sup>177</sup> freedom from punishment; and *immunitas*,<sup>178</sup> whose meaning of freedom or exemption from public services, burdens, or charges survives in the English word ‘immunity.’

Yet another negative construction of liberty is the word ‘*securitas*,’<sup>179</sup> security. It literally means freedom from care or

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<sup>173</sup> When Augustus claims in his *Res Gestae* ‘*rem publicam* (. . .) *in libertatem vindicavi*,’ he just deploys a standard expression, which Wirszubski renders as ‘I worked for the public good.’ In Charles Wirszubski, *Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome During the Late Republic and the Principate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), 116.

<sup>174</sup> From the Latin verb *liceo*. See Plautus, *Trinummus* 4.3.27.

<sup>175</sup> Plautus *Curculio* 2, 3, 40.

<sup>176</sup> Julius Caesar, *De Bello Gallico* 6.14.

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.14. As adverb *impūne* (archaic orthography *impæne*), see Plautus, *Mostellaria* 5.2.59.

<sup>178</sup> Julius Caesar, *De Bello Gallico* 6.14. As adjective *immunis*, see Plautus, *Trinummus* 2.2.75.

<sup>179</sup> Cicero, *Letters to Atticus* 4.18.

trouble, as it is derived through the adjective *securus* from the two words *sine*, without, and *cura*, care.

Our current progressive lexicon still relies on Latin technical terms that describe the passage from the enslaved condition to the superior status of freedom. The word ‘liberation’ literally repeats the act of *liberare*, to liberate from slavery; the even more precise term ‘emancipation’ retains the linguistic traces of the Latin term *emancipatio*, that is, enfranchisement,<sup>180</sup> as the gesture of being released from the grip of the hand (*ex manu capere*).

The Greek emphasis on the capacity of not being subjected to someone else resonates with the Latin definition *sui juris*, literally of one’s own right, that is, having full legal capacity, as opposed to *alieni juris*, literally, of someone else’s right, that is, under the legal authority of another. This distinction appears in Gaius’ second-century law manual as a definition of the analogous unbalanced relations of master and slave, husband and wife, and father and children.<sup>181</sup>

In the phrase *sui juris*, *sui* is the genitive singular form of the word *suus*, which may be translated in English as ‘his’ or ‘one’s own.’ Yet, in another surviving fragment of the Twelve Tables, the word *suus*<sup>182</sup> most probably is not deployed with a possessive function

<sup>180</sup> The word *mancipium*, ‘taking by hand,’ defined the taking possession of a purchase: conversely, according to the Twelve Tables, the enfranchisement of the son from paternal authority was performed as a triple act of selling: ‘*si pater filium ter venum duit, filius a patre liber esto.*’ If the father sells the son three times, be the son freed from the father. Quoted in Gaius 1.132.

<sup>181</sup> ‘*Nam quaedam personae sui iuris sunt, quaedam alieno iuri sunt subiectae.*’ For some persons have jurisdiction upon themselves, and some are subjected to the jurisdiction of others. *Ibid.*, 1.48.

<sup>182</sup> ‘*Si intestato moritur, cui suus heres nec escit, adgnatus proximus familiam habeto,*’ if a man dies intestate, and if he has no heir who is a *suus* [that is to say, one of the closed

but to denote the group of *sui* (in the plural), that is, the direct descendants. Benveniste argues that such an archaic use of the word *suus* shows that the notion of self, and that one of freedom on which it is predicated, evolved from a social grounding.<sup>183</sup>

Whilst, as we saw, in Greece and Rome this social grounding finds expression in the collective category of free men, Germanic languages reveal a different path: as also witnessed by the German word *frei*,<sup>184</sup> free, and its cognate *freund*, friend, Germanic languages produce the notion of free man as the effect of a relation of companionship. Hence, whilst the English word ‘freedom’ is nowadays interchangeable with the word ‘liberty,’ it traces quite a different semantic trajectory in time.<sup>185</sup>

However, the convergence of the two major morpho-semantic roots of our contemporary notion of freedom certainly owes a great deal to the Christian doctrine of individual salvation. In the next chapter, I will show how Christian thought works at decontextualizing both notions of individual and freedom by emphasizing individual identity as centred on the soul, and on individual responsibility and will.

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group of immediate descendants], the nearest [male] agnate kinsman shall inherit. In Ulpian, *Regulae* 26.1.

<sup>183</sup> Benveniste, *Vocabulaire* 1, 333. Eng. trans. *id.*, *Indo-European*, 272.

<sup>184</sup> Supposedly derived from the proto-Germanic term *\*frija*, from the supposed Indo-European term *\*prjos*.

<sup>185</sup> See Benveniste, *Vocabulaire* 1, 327. Eng. trans. *id.*, *Indo-European*, 267. See also Richard Broxton Onians, *The Origins of European Thought: About the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951).